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The Impact of the Unitary Patent and the Unified Patent Court on the
Prevalence of Patent Trolls in the European Union
By Sofia Kopelevich

I.

Introduction
Patent protection in Europe has evolved over the years. Each patent system had its faults

and was revised to the next system in hopes of overcoming the faults of its predecessor. Nowadays,
an individual seeking to obtain patent protection in Europe has to select between two options: (1)
a national patent, or (2) a European patent. Regardless of the option selected - obtaining and
enforcing patent protection in several European countries results in significant procedural
complexities and monetary investment. Thus, in an effort to simplify the process, cut the costs
involved, unify patent enforcement, and promote innovation in the European Union (EU),
regulations establishing a Unitary Patent (UP) and a Unified Patent Court (UPC) system were
proposed.
The proposed UP and UPC enhanced cooperation regulations present significant changes
to the EU’s current patent system and are accompanied with concerns. Concerns regarding the
upcoming system involve, inter alia, the costs of obtaining and keeping a UP; the experience of
the judges that will be appointed to the UPC; and the applicable substantive and procedural law
involved in enforcing the UP, such as the threshold for warranting preliminary injunctions and the
discretion in bifurcating litigations to separate patent invalidity and patent infringement
proceedings. The last concern mentioned is further supplemented with a fear that the UPC will
fragment the EU and create “patentee friendly” divisions, thereby bolstering the effect of Non
Practicing Entities (NPEs) in Europe.
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NPEs are controversial participants in the global patent system. Although, NPEs may be
characterized differently, this paper regards NPEs as intellectual property asset management firms
whose exclusive business model is asserting patent claims to collect significant fees from
companies operating in certain industries. Such firms are also known in the industry as “patent
trolls”, “patent thickets”, “patent assertion entities,” and these terms may be used throughout the
paper interchangeably.
Many professionals and scholars believe that the “patent troll” problem is exclusive to the
United States (US). This assertion, however, is mistaken as NPEs do attack companies and
inventors in the EU, although far less frequently. The EU’s future UP and UPC system is very
similar to the existing US patent system. The changes accompanying this future EU patent system
may encourage more “patent trolls” to try their luck in the EU. Therefore, it is detrimental that all
stakeholders propose and incorporate anti “patent trolls” clauses in the corresponding agreements
and regulations.
This paper will begin in part II by describing the European patent system as it is known
today. Part III will discuss the challenges with the current system. Part IV will introduce the newly
proposed supplemental patent system comprising of the UP and UPC. Subsequently, in part V, I
will define NPEs, their business model, as well as their impact in the EU pre and post
implementation of the UP and UPC system. Lastly, I will propose prophylactic legislative
safeguards to minimize the presence of “patent trolls” and their harm in the UP and UPC system.

II.

The Current Patent System
An individual seeking patent protection in the EU and in its member states (MSs) may

pursue a few routes. Such individuals consider several factors when selecting the route that best
fits their needs. The factors include: the type of invention claimed, the target market, the financial
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investment, the return on investment and so forth. The routes that are currently available for future
patent holders include pursuing national patent protection and/or pursuing a European patent
described in part II(2). An additional option that is anticipated to become effective as of the end of
2016 or beginning of 2017 is the UP described in part IV(1).1
1.

National Patent Protection
Obtaining national patent protection in a plurality of EU MSs can swiftly become a very

expensive endeavor. Therefore, patent applicants often balance various factors and come up with
a strategic solution that will best achieve their business goals. When such a strategic solution
requires the invention to be patented in a small number of independent states, the patent applicant
may find it more cost effective to file individual patent applications in each state of interest.2 This
approach exists because each state, regardless of whether it is a MS of the EU, maintains some of
its sovereignty in the area of national patent law.3
Acquiring national patent protection requires that the patent applicant file a separate patent
application in each state of interest.4 No shortcuts are available and if the applicant is interested in
a plurality of states, this route can become very time consuming, costly, and administratively
complex.5
A national patent gives the patent owner regional patent rights that are only valid in the
state in which the patent was acquired.6 These rights cannot be asserted in any other country.7

1

12th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, (Oct. 19, 2015), available at http://unified-patent-court.org/news/9795-12th-meeting-of-the-preparatory-committee-19-october-2015.
2
National Applications, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/applying/national.html (last updated
Jun. 22, 2015).
3
Id.
4
David Medina, How The Unitary Patent Will Fragment European Patent Law, 47 Ariz. St. L. J. 319, 323 (2015)
[hereinafter Medina].
5
Id.
6
National Applications, supra note 2.
7
Id.
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National patent protection rights vary among the states and are governed by national laws which
could be beneficial in some instances but harmful in others.8
To address some of the challenges that patent applicants are confronted with when they
wish to obtain patent protection in a plurality of states, the European Patent route was established.
2.

The Classical European Patent
Many European MSs wanted to strengthen co-operation and to simplify the process of

obtaining a patent by creating a single procedure that applied among all participating states.9 These
MSs became part of the European Patent Convention (EPC) in 1973.10 The EPC established a
European Patent Organization comprising of a European Patent Office (EPO) and an
Administrative Council.11 The Administrative Council oversees the EPO.12 The EPO is located in
Munich and it is responsible for granting European Patents.13 The official languages of the EPO
are English, French, and German, and all patent applications filed with the EPO have to be in one
of the official languages or translated into one of the official languages to avoid its withdrawal.14
Granting a European patent to a patent applicant involves several inquiries such as whether the
subject matter is patentable, novel, inventive and industrially applicable.15
Filing a patent application with the EPO automatically designates all EPC participating
states (occasionally subject to the payment of a designation fee) as a potential state in which the

8

National Applications, supra note 2.
Member states of the European Patent Organisation, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, http://www.epo.org/aboutus/organisation/member-states.html (last updated Jul. 9, 2015) (AL, AT, BE, BG, CH, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EE, ES, FI,
FR, GB, GR, HR, HU, IE, IS, IT, LI, LT, LU, LV, MC, MK, MT, NL, NO, PL, PT, RO, RS, SE, SI, SK, SM, TR).
10
European Patent Convention, art. PREAMBLE, Oct. 5, 1973, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/epc.html [hereinafter EPC].
11
Id., at art. 4.
12
Id.
13
Id., at art. 6.
14
Id., at art. 14.
15
Id., at arts. 52-9.
9
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European patent may be validated once it is granted. 16 In addition to the preliminary designation,
once a European patent is granted, the applicant may choose to validate the patent in any one of
the EPC designated participating states.17 To validate a patent in any particular state, the applicant
has to fulfill certain national requirements.18 Some exemplary national requirements include
translating the patent (or parts of it, e.g. the claims) into the national language and paying renewal
or annuity fees.19 Upon validation, the national law of each state will govern the patent’s
enforceability in that state. 20
A granted European patent has a term of 20 years from the filing date of the application,
thereby granting its owners the right to exclude others from engaging in infringing activities during
the patent’s lifetime. 21 Infringing activities are dealt with in national courts,22 which may choose
to request the EPO’s technical opinion on the subject matter at issue.23 The same standard of review
applies when a national court reviews an infringement of a European patent or an infringement of
a national patent.24

III.

Challenges with the Existing System
The existing European patent system withstood the test of time and has proven its success

decades after the implementation of the EPC.25 Nevertheless, stakeholders continue to face
challenges with the current system; particularly after the European patent gets granted, also

16

EPC, supra note 10, at art. 79.
Id., at art. 74.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id., at art. 63.
22
Id., at art. 64.
23
Id., at art. 25.
24
Id., at art. 66.
25
Stefan Luginbuehl, Unitary Patent Protection and Unified Patent Court, EPO.ORG, https://ecourses.epo.org/mod/streaming/view.php?id=7188 (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Luginbuehl].
17
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referred to as the “post grant” stage.26 Once the European patent gets granted, the applicant has to
select in which of the previously designated states it wishes to validate the European patent, and
follow each state’s national validation requirements.27 The validation requirements are not
harmonized among all the states, creating an additional level of complexity. 28 Additionally, the
applicant has to file a translation of the granted European patent to each official language of the
EPC participating states and pay separate renewal fees in each state they wish to validate in,
thereby exacerbating the costs associated with the post grant procedure.29
The cost, administrative burden, and complexity are further increased if the granted and
validated patents get challenged in court. Validity and infringement proceedings occur
independently in each national court pursuant to the governing national laws since there is no
current harmonized patent court system, nor is there a harmonized patent law on the EU level.30
While many national courts may rely on the EPC for guidance, they may also rely on judicially
created laws in their particular nation which differ between states.31 Accordingly, patent owners
have to contemplate various litigation strategies depending on which state the patent is being
challenged or asserted in.32 Occasionally patent litigation may occur in multiple states
simultaneously, thereby requiring the implementation of multiple strategies simultaneously in a
plurality of jurisdictions while ensuring that the various strategies do not contradict or harm each
other.33 One can envisage the undue burden such a scenario may pose on an applicant attempting
to assert or defend their patent rights in today’s EU patent system.

26

Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
EPC, supra note 10, at art. 74.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
27
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IV.

The Newly Proporsed Patent System
To cope with the various challenges presented by the existing system, a new EU unitary

package comprising of a UP and a UPC were proposed.34 The EU’s unitary package is meant to
strengthen the European patent even further,35 and make the access to the patent system easier,
less costly, and legally secure.36
1.

The Unitary Patent
On December 17, 2012, twenty-five EU MSs joined to enact two enhanced cooperation

regulations, namely regulation 1257/2012 and 1260/2012, to establish a UP and agree on the
official languages for the UP, respectively.37 The UP regulations provide substantive law as to the
definition of the unitary effect, patent exhaustion,38 and the scope of licensing agreements.39
The UP will have a unitary character in all participating states.40 It will be jointly granted
in all participating states at once, but can also be jointly invalidated in all participating states at
once.41 The UP will be a European patent granted by the EPO pursuant to the EPC and will have
a uniform protection and equal effect in all twenty-five states that ratify the UP regulation.42 This

34

Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
PREFACE BY THE PRESIDENT, EPC, supra note 10.
36
Regulation 1257/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2012 on Implementing
Enhanced Cooperation in the Area of Creation of Unitary Patent Protection, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 4 (EU) http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32012R1257&qid=1442588116640&rid=1 [hereinafter Regulation
1257/2012].
37
Medina, supra note 4, at 319.
38
“Patent Exhaustion is a concept in patent law that limits a patentee’s monopoly over controlling when one can use
or sell a patented technology. See generally Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625-26
(2008). Once a patentee sells a patented technology to a consumer, the patentee can no longer sue to prevent that
consumer from selling the patented technology to another consumer. Id.” Medina, supra note 4, at 328.
39
Id.
40
Participating states in the unitary patent agreement include Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark,
Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, France, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the
Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at art. 3.
41
Medina, supra note 4, at 328; also Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at art. 7.
42
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (7).
35
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“special agreement”43 intends to promote enhanced cooperation in the creation of a UP, allowing
some MSs to adopt the UP immediately, and other MSs to opt in at a later stage.44 Although the
UP regulation entered into force on January 20, 2013, and was signed by twenty-five MSs in
Brussels on February 19, 2013, it will not become available until a UPC, tasked with enforcing the
UP, becomes effective.45
The UP seeks to simplify the administrative and financial burdens of the post grant
procedures only.46 The process for obtaining a UP will be similar to that of obtaining a classical
European patent described in Part II(2). This will include, inter alia, translation into two of the
official languages,47 the same opposition period, the same appeal procedure, as well as the same
examination criteria.48 Once a European Patent is granted, the applicant will have to explicitly
request a UP. The UP will become immediately effective in all twenty-five participating states.49
Such requests will also have a somewhat retroactive effect. This option will be available for new
European patent applications filed after the UP regulation becomes effective as well as for
European patent applications filed before the UP regulation becomes effective but only get granted
after the UP regulation becomes effective.50 Thus, the UP will broaden the possibilities for
applicants who currently have pending patent applications with the EPO.

The idea that regulation 1257/2012 “constitutes a special agreement within the meaning of article 142 of the EPC.
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (6).
44
Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
45
Id.
46
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (7).
47
The official languages are French, English, and German. Council Regulation 1260/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 361) 89
(EU), at art. 6, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:32012R1260&qid=1442588116640&rid=4 [hereinafter Regulation 1260/2012].
48
Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
49
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (18).
50
Id., at (8).
43
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Furthermore, only MSs of the EU may participate in the UP agreement and not all thirtyeight states who participate in the EPC.51 Therefore, applicants may request a UP for the twentyfive participating states and a classical European patent for states that are part of the EPC but not
part of the UP regulation (such as Italy, Norway, Switzerland).52 Applicants may not obtain a
classical European patent on top of the UP in EU MSs that ratify the UP.53 However, applicants
may have a UP in EU MSs that ratify the UP and a classical European patent in states that do not
participate in the UP regulation.54 Some states may allow the privilege of obtaining a national
patent in addition to a UP.55 Such a privilege is governed by national laws and may vary among
the states.56
Essentially the UP takes the “all or nothing” approach, wherein applicants either obtain
patent rights in all participating states or in none of them.57 Withdrawing from a single state results
in withdrawal of the UP from all states.58 However, since obtaining a European patent depends on
whether the claimed invention was invented or filed first (depending on whether it is a “first to
file” or “first to invent” jurisdiction); what happens if the European UP is the first such invention
in twenty-four states, but in the twenty-fifth state, a national patent on a similar invention already
exists thereby invalidating the European UP in that particular state? Does the UP as a whole with
respect to all 25 states get invalidated? It seems that the answer is uncertain but it could fall under
one of the following two options: (1) the entire UP as a whole will get invalidated; or (2) the
applicant will be able to opt out of the UP and apply for a classical European patent which may be

51

Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
Regulation 1257/ 2012, supra note 36, at (26).
53
Id., at (8) & (26).
54
Id.
55
Id., at (26).
56
Id.
57
Id., at (26) & art. 3(2).
58
Id.
52
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validated in individual states pursuant to the applicant’s selection.59 If option two becomes the
rule, will it only apply for a limited time period after the grant of the European patent60 or will it
apply long after the UP is granted as a mitigation tool in case the UP gets invalidated in litigation?
The answer here will likely be the former, limiting the opt out period, since any litigation at a later
stage will be addressed at the specialized patent court which should apply a harmonized law and
have a harmonized effect across all states.
2.

The Unified Patent Court
The UPC is an additional vital component of the EU unitary package, which was adopted

as a third provision61 about two months after the enactment of the UP regulations.62 The UPC will
have exclusive jurisdiction over UP infringement and UP invalidity proceedings, supplementary
protection certificate infringement, provisional and protective measures, damages and injunctions
remedies, and appeals against the EPO’s decisions with respect to the UP.63 The UPC agreement
provides guidance to UPC judges as to the substantive law related to direct infringement, indirect
infringement, exceptions to infringement, patent exhaustion, revocation of a patent, and
injunctions.64 The UPC’s institutional hierarchy will comprise of courts of first instance, a court
of appeals, and the court of justice of the European Union.65

59

Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
For example, for the opposition time period. The opposition time period extends for nine months after the grant of
the European Patent, during which any party who wishes to challenge the validity of the patent may do so with the
EPO. After nine months lapse, a party wishing to challenge the validity of the patent may only do so through the
court system. Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
61
Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, Feb. 19, 2013, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/AUTO/?uri=CELEX:42013A0620%2801%29&qid=1442588116640&rid=3 [hereinafter
UPC Agreement].
62
Medina, supra note 4, at 320.
63
UPC Agreement, supra note 61, art. 32.
64
Medina, supra note 4, at 328.
65
UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 6.
60
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Courts of first instance will include local and regional divisions in the various contracting
states, with a central division for general patent matters in Paris, a pharmaceutical division in
London, and an engineering division in Munich.66 The specialized divisions in Paris, London, and
Munich will be run by several states ensuring a harmonized law. 67 The number of courts of first
instance divisions in each state will depend on the case workload, wherein increased workload in
a particular state will render the establishment of additional divisions in that state while ensuring
that the number of divisions does not exceed four per state.68
The court of appeals will be located in Luxembourg.69 As with all national courts, the courts
of first instance and the court of appeals may direct questions related to EU law interpretation to
the Court of Justice of the EU and request for a preliminary ruling.70 The UPC further comprises
a patent mediation and arbitration center located in Lisbon and in Ljubljana, and a training center
for judges located in Budapest.71
a. Choice of Law
The UP and the UPC are independent enhanced cooperation regulations, wherein each of
the MSs of the EU may choose to adopt one and not the other, not to adopt either, or to adopt both.
Thus, four applicable patent laws may result once the UP regulations and UPC agreement become
effective, namely: (1) classical European patents that do not adopt either regulation; (2) European
UPs in countries that adopt the UP, but do not adopt the UPC; (3) Classical European patents in
countries that adopt the UPC, but do not adopt the UP; and (4) European UPs in countries that
adopt the UP and UPC.

66

UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 7.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id., at art. 9.
70
Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
71
UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 35.
67
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The first applicable law for states that refuse to adopt either the UP regulations or the UPC
agreement represents the current situation, the status quo.72 Under this category, the governing law
will remain national patent law along with the current version of a classical European patent
system.73 An exemplary state that falls under this category is Spain.74
The governing law in states that ratify the UP regulations but not the UPC will likely be a
combination of existing national law and the laws set out in the UP regulations.75 This category is
unique because the EU Parliament, Commission, and Council did not anticipate any of the states
to take this path, and even withheld the application of the UP until a complementary UPC system
becomes effective.76 Nevertheless, some states fall under this category.77 However, the UP
regulations are not comprehensive and do not recite the rights to which a patent holder will be
entitled, lending themselves to be indirectly governed by the laws of the UPC even if a particular
state does not ratify the UPC agreement.78 Additionally, patent disputes, such as patent
infringement suits, will be either brought in front of a national court (if the infringement occurs in
a non-UPC state) or in front of a UPC court (if infringement occurs in a UPC state), and will likely
apply UPC law.79 An exemplary state that falls under this category is Poland.80

72

Medina, supra note 4, at 329.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Regulation 1257/2012, supra note 36, at (9).
76
Id., at (25).
77
Medina, supra note 4, at 329.
78
Id., at 331, for the idea that “Article 5(2) required that the scope of patent holder rights “shall be uniform in all
participating Member States.” For the enhanced cooperation regulations to work, all countries that ratify the
regulation must have the same patent holder rights. . . the Unified Patent Court agreement will serve as the de facto
source for patent holder rights. Therefore, countries that do not ratify the Unified Patent Court agreement will likely
be forced to provide patent holders the rights listed in the Unified Patent Court agreement, or risk violating Article
5(2) of the Enhanced Cooperation Regulation.”
79
Id., at 329-31.
80
Id., at 329.
73
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The governing law for states that ratify the UPC agreement but not the UP regulations will
be the laws set out in the UPC agreement.81 Patent dispute suits involving national patents82 will
be raised in a national court, whereas patent disputes involving classical European patents will be
reviewed in the UPC which will have exclusive jurisdiction over both classical and UP disputes.83
An exemplary state that falls under this category is Italy.84
In states that ratify both the UP regulations and the UPC agreement,85 the UPC will have
exclusive jurisdiction over both classical European patent disputes and UP disputes while national
courts will retain jurisdiction over disputes arising from national patents.86 The governing laws
will be those set out in the UPC agreement and the UP regulations. 87 Exemplary states are all
twenty-five EU MSs that ratify the UP regulations and the UPC agreement.88 Any of the three
remaining MSs discloses above, such as Spain, Poland, and Italy, may opt in at a later stage.89
b. Existing Concerns with the Establishment of the Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court
The EU unitary package raised many concerns among stakeholders in the patent
community. How will judges for the UPC be chosen?90 Will the judges have proper experience in
the patent sphere and in the particular technical areas at issue?91 How will litigation proceedings
run? Will invalidity and infringement proceedings be combined or bifurcated?92 What will be the

81

The UPC agreement provides UPC judges guidance as to the substantive law related to direct infringement,
indirect infringement, exceptions to infringement, patent exhaustion, revocation of a patent, and injunctions. UPC
Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 19.
82
National patent are independently applied for in each state. National Applications, supra note 2.
83
Medina, supra note 4, at 329.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id., at 329, 336.
87
Id., at 329.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
James Nurton, How to make the unitary patent work, 227 Managing Intell. Prop. 4 (2013) [hereinafter Nurton].
91
Id.
92
D. Rose & C. Forsyth, The Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court: An Overview (2015), available at
http://www.kwm.com/en/uk/knowledge/insights/the-new-eu-patent-package-20130601#.Vfwo7SYW6Jk.email
[hereinafter Rose].
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standard for preliminary injunctions?93 Will the variation in applicable law fragment the European
patent system?94 Will the new system add complexity and costs?95 Will the new system attract
NPEs?96
Although not a comprehensive list, these questions illustrate the ongoing struggle of
everyone involved with adopting the new system and may somewhat explain the delay in its
adoption (a shift from the original estimate of 2014 to the current estimate of 2017).97 Some of the
questions will be addressed briefly below, with a more detailed discussion regarding the impact of
the new system on the prevalence of NPEs in the EU.
i.

Procedures for Appointing Judges
All divisions of the courts of first instance will have multi-national panels with three judges

drawn from at least two different contracting member states.98 The judges may be legally qualified
and/or technically qualified, with the technically qualified judges being present on the panel
primarily to educate the non-technical judges on counterclaims of invalidity in infringement cases
to determine the need for a bifurcated trial.99 The legally qualified judges will possess the
qualifications required to become judges in a national court.100 The technically qualified judges
will have a university degree in a technical field, some technical experience, and familiarity with

93

L.Mueller & M. Modiano, Patent Trolls: A View from Europe, (Feb. 24, 2014), available at
https://bricwallblog.wordpress.com/2014/02/24/patent-trolls-a-view-from-europe/ [hereinafter Mueller].
94
Medina, supra note 4.
95
Rose, supra note 92.
96
Mueller, supra note 93.
97
12th meeting of the Preparatory Committee, supra note 1.
98
Rose, supra note 92; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8.
99
UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 8.
100
Unified Patent Court, UNIFIED-PATENT-COURT.ORG, available at http://unified-patent-court.org/about-theupc/14-category-a (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) [hereinafter UPC]; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 15.
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the legal and procedural aspects of patent litigation.101 All judges will have to be in “good
command” of at least one of the official languages of the EPO.102
The judges will be selected from a list of candidates who show interest and are found
compatible through a review of the UPC’s Advisory Committee.103 Candidates considered
compatible by the UPC’s Advisory Committee will include patent judges and practitioners in
patent law and patent litigation.104 Although the judges’ selection process seems promising,
stakeholders are concerned that simply providing for a multi-national panel of judges may not be
enough because the need is to not only have diversity of views but also experience in the subject
matter.105 To ensure that experienced judges are appointed to the different courts in the UPC,
judges from busy courts such as Germany, UK, and the Netherlands would be preferable, but their
number is limited and some of them may not even apply.106 It is particularly important to have
experienced judges in the court of appeals.107 However, as previously stated, the court of appeals
is located in Luxembourg, making it somewhat uncertain whether the court’s location will deter
experienced patent judges from seeking appointment there.108
ii.

Litigation Proceedings (Preliminary Injunctions and Bifurcation)
Whether the UPC divisions will bifurcate litigation proceedings to separate patent validity

and infringement claims is an ongoing debate. Should the UPC resolve the entire case in a single
proceeding, following the practice of Italy and the UK?109 Or should the UPC bifurcate each
proceeding into two separate trials (one for patent validity determination, and one for infringement

101

UPC, supra note 100; also UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 15.
Id.
103
UPC Agreement, supra note 61, at art. 16.
104
Id.
105
Nurton, supra note 90.
106
Id.
107
Kevin Mooney, An Insider’s View of the UPC, 228 Managing Intell. Prop. 29 (2013) [hereinafter Mooney].
108
Id.
109
Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
102
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determination) following the practice of Austria, Germany, and the Czech Republic?110 Currently
there are no clear guidelines giving local and regional divisions discretion to decide on a case by
case basis whether to bifurcate.111
Local and regional divisions, based on the complexity of each case and on whether a
validity counterclaim was made, have three options to choose from: (1) hold a trial on all issues
(infringement and validity); (2) bifurcate the trial into a validity and an infringement proceeding,
refer the validity proceeding to the central division in Paris, and either suspend the infringement
proceeding if there is a high likelihood that the relevant claims of the patent are invalid, or proceed
with the infringement proceeding; or (3) refer the case as a whole to the central division in Paris.112
The UPC rules also include a provision for option (2) reciting that when the infringement
proceeding is not suspended, the central division will accelerate the date of the validity proceeding
so that a validity decision can be made before the infringement proceeding takes place. 113 The
feasibility of this provision remains to be seen.
In the meantime, defendants are very concerned about the implications of placing such
discretionary power with the UPC.114 Plaintiffs may choose to argue their cases broadly, thereby
easily obtaining preliminary injunctions relying on weak patents that may be found to be invalid
during a narrow invalidity proceeding.115 The concern is that local and regional divisions in states
that used the bifurcation system may continue to bifurcate and become the venue of choice for
plaintiffs who seek to take advantage of this system, such as NPEs.116 This can result in undue
burden to the defendant that in some instances may be enough to bring the defendant to bankruptcy.

110

Luginbuehl, supra note 25.
Id.
112
Rose, supra note 98.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
See infra Part V.
111
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V.

Non Practicing Entities
NPEs, also known as “patent trolls”, “patent thickets”, and “patent assertion entities,” are

defined as “IP asset management firms whose exclusive business is asserting patent claims to
collect significant fees from companies operating in certain industries.”117 The business model of
NPEs consists of a few main steps, namely: acquiring patents in certain industries,118 waiting for
a potential infringer to make an irreversible investment in a potentially infringing technology, and
asserting the acquired patent against the potential infringer to extract money from them.119 As
such, NPEs do not use their patents in the market and do not get involved in any research or
development of the technology or products related to their patent portfolio.120 Furthermore, NPEs
do not help with “technology transfer.”121 Instead, NPEs form their patent portfolio by purchasing
patents from a plurality of sources, including small and large companies, bankrupt companies,
start-ups, solo inventors, hospitals, universities, and even the government.122 This arrangement
allows NPEs to take advantage of their non-practicing status by asserting their patents against
potential infringers without being vulnerable to infringement counter-claims123 or bearing
research, development and manufacturing costs.
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NPE’s business model follows this typical sequence of events. After the NPE acquires a
patent, it seeks out a potential infringer. Once it identifies such infringer, the NPE will often wait
for the potential infringer to make an irreversible investment in the technology and become highly
dependent financially on that technology.124 The NPE will then send the potential infringer a cease
and desist letter accusing the company of infringing one or more of its acquired patents. The
potential infringer will have three options of how to respond to the NPE threat: (1) cease
infringement and risk bankruptcy because their company is now financially dependent on that
particular technology to survive; (2) litigate in court to either show that the patent the NPE is
attempting to assert is weak and invalid, or that the company is not infringing on the patent asserted
against them; or (3) surrender to the threat, avoid litigation, and pay royalties to the NPE to
continue using the technology.125 Due to the high stakes involved with options (1) and (2), i.e.
bankruptcy and costly litigation with an uncertain outcome, companies often resort to the third
option.126 In fact, this practice has gotten so prevalent in the United States that companies coined
the term – “NPE tax.”127
1.

The Threat of NPEs
The consequences of NPEs’ threats and lawsuits could be devastating not only to the

companies under attack, but also to society as a whole. The purpose of patents is to foster
innovation. That notion is rooted in our society as can be seen from the language of the United
States Constitution, which grants Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing, for limited times, to . . . inventors, the exclusive right to their . . .
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discoveries.”128 This concept is not restricted solely to the United States, as the EPC provides in
the preamble:
“the contracting states to the European Patent Convention . . .
wishing to promote innovation and economic growth in Europe still
more effectively by laying foundations for the further development
of the European Patent System . . . have agreed [to adopt the
European Patent Convention’s provisions].”129
The idea of promoting innovation through patent protection, emphasized both in the United States
and in Europe, requires inventors to be motivated and have the right to research, develop, and
invent, and then be able to patent the fruits of their labor and recoup their investment without an
impeding threat that some immoral practice will preclude them from this right.
The prevalence of NPEs discourages inventors from researching and developing in
particular technologies where NPEs are more present and likely to attack.130 It further discourages
inventors from disclosing their inventions to the public, thereby keeping inventions as trade
secrets.131 As a result, certain trade secrets that could be used by other innovators to develop other
inventions, become inaccessible, thereby suppressing and delaying overall innovation.132 NPEs
have added significant costs to the innovation ecosystem, with very little of that cost actually
recirculating back into innovation.133 The social implications of NPEs are real. NPEs currently
seem to be a creature of the U.S. economy more than that of Europe’s economy.134 Nevertheless,
NPEs may play a greater role with Europe’s upcoming unitary package system.135
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a. The Threat of NPEs in Pre EU Unitary Package System
Patent troll activity does occur in Europe even with the patent system that is currently in
place. The activity is most prevalent in Germany, and less so in France, United Kingdom,
Netherlands,136 Sweden, Italy, Norway, and Ireland137. For example, in Germany between 2000
and 2008, data about the number of infringement cases revealed about 8,800 infringement suits,
or slightly less than a 1000 infringement suits a year.138 Germany has far more infringement suits
filed annually than any other EU MS.139 To illustrate the large disparity, similar data was collected
in the UK between 2000-2008 and resulted in the finding of about 250 infringement cases, or less
than 30 infringement suits a year.140 In comparison, NPE activity in the United States in 2012 alone
accounted for 62% of all patent suits (about 2,500 patent assertion lawsuits by NPEs out of about
4000 patent assertion lawsuits overall).141 NPEs are present in Europe and the number of NPE
attacks is on the rise.142 Even though presently, United States remains in the lead with regard to
NPEs, with the future unitary system, NPEs may become a more serious concern in the EU than
they have been thus far.143
b. The threat of NPEs in post EU unitary package system
As illustrated in Part V.1.a., the disparity between patent troll attacks in the various states
of the EU is substantial. Such a great disparity naturally raises the question- “why is there such a
great disparity?” The simple answer is that patent trolls seek to assert their patents in jurisdictions
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which have “patentee friendly” laws and procedures. But what makes a jurisdiction “patentee
friendly?”
The differences between the German and United Kingdom patent systems are numerous in
number, with each factor playing a role in Germany’s “patentee friendly” status. First, Germany
uses a bifurcated system whereas the UK does not.144 Based on the bifurcated system, it is possible
for a regional court in Germany to grant an injunction against a potential infringer of a patent that
is later found invalid.145 Additionally, the bifurcated system gives rise to inconsistencies in claim
interpretation, since the different courts, resolving separate issues of infringement and validity,
construct the claims independently.146 This creates a problem where a court, reviewing the claims
for infringement purposes, will issue an injunction against a defendant on the basis of a broad
claim construction, and simultaneously a court, reviewing the claims for validity purpose, will
interpret the claims narrowly, finding the patent asserted for injunctions purposes invalid.147
Second, in Germany, several regional courts are competent to hear patent cases, whereas
in the UK, there is a centralized system for patent litigation.148 Thus, plaintiffs in Germany have
several venues to choose from when filing an infringement claim.149 This enables patent trolls to
forum shop to select the venue in which they are most likely to ultimately prevail or at least obtain
a preliminary injunction. Such favorable venues are also known as “patentee friendly” courts.150
Inventors that are faced with an infringement suit in a “patentee friendly” court are encouraged to
settle with terms that are more favorable to the patent trolls.151 In contrast, in the UK the venue of
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the lawsuit depends on the size and value of the claim and not on the plaintiff’s preference.152
Furthermore, in the UK there are only two courts dedicated for patent litigation, and both are
located in London.153 The reduced number of regional courts in the UK not only reduces forum
shopping, but also allows for more uniform outcomes.
Third, the duration of the proceeding in Germany is relatively speedy as compared to other
EU MSs.154 This is possible, in large part, due to Germany’s bifurcated system, allowing Germany
to enter judgments for patent infringement and preliminary injunction proceedings without
reviewing the validity of the patent asserted. These differences in proceeding durations provide
strategic incentives for patent trolls to file patent infringement suits in faster jurisdictions.155
When reviewing the UPC agreement, keeping in mind the factors listed above for a
“patentee friendly” jurisdiction, several provisions seem to be as problematic. Two of the UPC
provisions are particularly controversial.156 The first provision is contained in Article 62(4) of the
UPC agreement, which states:
“The Court may, in respect of the measures referred to in
paragraphs 1 and 3, require the applicant to provide any reasonable
evidence in order to satisfy itself with a sufficient degree of certainty
that the applicant is the right holder and that the applicant's right is
being infringed, or that such infringement is imminent.”157
According to this provision, a patent troll may bring an infringement suit, requesting the court to
grant a preliminary injunction, and the court may, at its discretion, require the patent troll plaintiff
to provide “reasonable evidence” to show that the asserted patent is being infringed. 158 The
inclusion of the terms “may” and “reasonable evidence” provide uncertainty and a great amount
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of discretion for regional and local divisions as to whether any evidence, whatsoever, is required
to show that the asserted patent is being infringed, and if so, what will be considered as “reasonable
evidence.”159 Some courts may set the standard so low that obtaining a preliminary injunction will
be so simple, perhaps even too simple.160 These divisions will be termed as “patentee friendly”
and targeted by patent trolls.161
The other controversial provision is Article 33(3) of the UPCA, which states:
(3) A counterclaim for revocation as referred to in Article 32(1)(e)
may be brought in the case of an action for infringement as referred
to in Article 32(1)(a). The local or regional division concerned
shall, after having heard the parties, have the discretion either
to:
(a)
proceed with both the action for infringement and
with the counterclaim for revocation and request the
President of the Court of First Instance to allocate from the
Pool of Judges in accordance with Article 18(3) a technically
qualified judge with qualifications and experience in the
field of technology concerned.
(b)
refer the counterclaim for revocation for decision to
the central division and suspend or proceed with the action
for infringement; or
(c)
with the agreement of the parties, refer the case for
decision to the central division.162
Article 33 determines the venue for an infringement proceeding. Specifically, and infringement
proceeding may be brought either in the area where the infringer is located or where infringement
occurs.163 However, if the potential infringer, against whom the patent is asserted, counterclaims
with an invalidity claim, the local division has the discretion to choose whether to: (1) handle the
entire case as a whole, (2) refer the counterclaim to the central division, or (3) refer the case as a
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whole to the central division.164 Defendants who are reluctant to give such discretion to the court,
may be hesitant to file a counterclaim due to the uncertainty involved.165
Furthermore, if a local court decides, at its discretion, to bifurcate the case and refer the
counter claim to the central division, they do not have to await the outcome of the counterclaim
action, and may proceed with the infringement suit.166 This action will nullify the defensive effect
of the counterclaim, thereby increasing the likelihood that the local division will find a potentially
invalid patent infringed.167 The consequences of frequent use of option (2) may enable patent trolls
to obtain favorable infringement judgment decisions on invalid patents resulting in devastating
outcomes for innocent defendants and for society through harm to innovation and economic
growth. 168
2.

Recommended Safeguards Against NPEs
Researchers and law scholars have previously looked into the prevalence of patent trolls in

the EU. Fusco concluded that patent trolls are active in the EU but to a lesser degree due to the
smaller size of the industries prone to patent troll attacks in the EU as compared to the U.S.169
Helmers, based on an empirical study, concluded that patent trolls are less active in the EU due to
the deterrent effect of the fee shifting scheme present in the EU’s legal system. 170 Even if Fusco
was correct to correlate the size of an industry to the likelihood of attacks by NPEs, with an evergrowing economy and developing technology, it is unlikely that the EU will stay far behind the
US for much longer. Accordingly, measures have to be taken from the very start to ensure that
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NPEs do not become more prevalent in the EU. These measures are especially urgent and vital in
view of the upcoming changes to the patent system through the new EU unitary package.
The new EU unitary package system greatly resembles the U.S. patent system. Therefore,
the EU has the advantage of being able to learn from the history of U.S.’s struggle with patent
trolls and adopt some of its strategies. Some of the measures recommended in the U.S. include
granting clearer and stronger patents, which are less likely to be interpreted inconsistently among
local and regional courts and reducing the disparity of litigation costs between patent owners and
technology users.171 The litigation costs can be reduced, for example, by limiting unnecessary
discovery of defendant’s documents at earlier stages yet requiring more evidence of patent validity
and patent infringement by the NPEs before allowing an infringement suit to proceed. These
measures have to be backed up with strong and clear rules of procedure that limit and reduce the
discretion of the court to almost non-existent levels.172 Alternatively, the UPC agreement may list
factors which the local and regional divisions will account for in making their discretionary
decision, and the weight given to each factor, so that defendants are given sufficient notice and
clear guidelines as to the best strategic move that will place them on a leveled playing field with
the patent trolls.

VI.

Conclusion
The current European patent system has proven its success over and over again for decades

since at least the adoption of the EPC. Yet, nowadays, with the EU becoming gradually more and
more uniform in all aspects, it seems that the EU, with the EU unitary package system, is striving
to create uniformity in its patent system. And so, an unbroken patent system must be fixed making
it simpler, inexpensive, and uniform. However, if the new patent system ironically simplifies by
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complicating, becomes inexpensive with additional fees, and becomes uniform through
fragmentation, has the nonexistent problem really been resolved?
The UP system adds a third type of patent protection individuals may seek, the UP enforced
in the UPC.173 It does not eliminate any of the existing patent options.174 Before, individuals only
had to balance two strategies to determine which is favorable, now they will have to review their
options under three potential strategies. To make things more complicated, the UP and UPC
regulations are not available for all states who are part of the EPC, but only to MSs of the EU.175
As a result, individuals will often have to resort to at least two types of patent protections to obtain
comprehensive protection in all the jurisdictions they are interested in. Reviewing an additional
strategic option as well as pursuing at least two types of patent protections, will naturally result in
more expenditure.
Additionally, it is hard enough to enforce uniform laws and uniform implementation of the
laws in the U.S., where all states speak the same language. Imagine just how much more difficult
it will be for the local and regional divisions of the UPC spread across many countries, run with
different languages, accustomed to different laws, to follow UP laws in three official languages
and implement them uniformly. With the lack of experience and fragmented institutions, the result
is very likely to be a fragmented, not a unified, patent court.
The weaknesses of the unitary system will be further exploited by patent trolls, who just
try to leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort money out of them in a
“legal” fashion. The only deterrent on patent trolls will be the fee shifting provision under which
the losing party in the infringement suit will be responsible for all attorney fees.176 However, patent
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trolls will adapt. They will select patentee friendly jurisdictions in the “fragmented patent court”
and obtain speedy preliminary injunctions based on invalid or very weak patents. 177 Defendants,
particularly small and medium sized companies whose existence will be threatened through the
patent troll infringement suit, will be too concerned that the patent trolls will threaten their entire
UP to fall in all twenty-five jurisdictions, and will rush to settle or pay licensing fees to the
prevailing patent trolls.178 Huge amounts of money will be taken away from the realm of
innovation and economic growth in direct contrast to the purpose of the EPC.179
Although this conclusion describes a horrifying scenario, absent proper measures, this may
very well be part of our future. It is important for stakeholders to comprehend the potentially
harmful consequences of the new system. Only by understanding the new system’s loopholes will
future laws, whether through regulations, directives, or case law, depict informed decisions,
provide clarity and guidance to defendants, and create deterrence to patent trolls.
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